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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983).
Through two recent criminal cases, State v. Bennett' and State v.
Cooper,2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals readdressed several
criminal procedure issues which affect trial judges and prosecutors alike. The
court (1) set constitutional parameters upon the broad discretion given trial
judges to impose sentences upon convicted defendants;' (2) reaffirmed limits
to judicial intervention at trial, holding improper any intimation of the
judge's opinion respecting a material issue;4 and (3) reaffirmed the statutory
mandate that prosecutors may not use a defendant's failure to testify as the
subject of comment before the jury.' Through its holdings, the court ex-
pressed a great concern for maintaining the fair administration of justice, as
well as for protecting the rights of defendants to impartial and error-free
trials by jury.
State v. Bennett' (herein referred to as Bennett II) was the second of two
trials wherein the appellant, Allen C. Bennett, was convicted for delivery of a
controlled substance.7 In Bennett II, the defendant was charged and con-
victed of delivery of a controlled substance, placidyl, to an undercover state
policeman.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in a per curiam
decision, reversed the conviction of Bennett due to three major errors which
prejudiced him at trial.' These three errors were (1) the overruling of the
defendant's challenges for cause against two prejudiced and biased jurors
during voir dire;"0 (2) the judge's improper intimation of his opinion during
questioning of a witness at trial;1 and (3) the prosecuting attorney's repeated
emphasis in his closing argument on the uncontradicted evidence in the case
amounting to an emphasis on Bennett's failure to testify."2
The first reversible error occurred when the trial judge overruled the
challenges for cause by Bennett's counsel against two prospective jurors. The
prospective jurors then had to be removed from the jury panel through use
1 304 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam).
2 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 857-59.
304 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
6 Id. at 35.
See State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam) (affirming conviction for
delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, despite an appeal asserting 13 assignments of
error).
304 S.E.2d at 37.
9Id
10 Id.
" Id. at 38.
12 Id. at 39.
1
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of peremptory strikes. 3 The court held that, although it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to refuse to excuse the prospective jurors simply
because they knew appellant had been previously convicted of a crime, it was
an abuse of the trial court's discretion to permit the prospective jurors to re-
main on the jury after they had admitted prejudice. 4
One of the prospective jurors admitted that he was "very prejudiced
against drug use," and that he thought persons guilty of delivery of con-
trolled substances "ought to be hung." 5 The other prospective juror, aware
of the appellant's past history, could only answer equivocally, "I think so,"
when asked if she could disregard previous information and base her verdict
solely on the evidence presented at trial. 6 The court stressed that the refusal
to remove these two jurors for cause after their admissions of prejudice and
bias denied the appellant his right to a panel of twenty jurors, free from ex-
ception, before being called upon to exercise his peremptory strikes.' In
reversing the lower decision, the court reaffirmed the principle that the true
test of the qualifications of a juror to serve on the panel is "whether without
bias or prejudice he [or she] can render a verdict solely on the evidence under
the instructions of the court."'8 The holding of the court reflects the extreme
care exercised by courts in general to preserve the constitutional right of an
accused to an impartial jury and a fair trial. 9
The second reversible error occurred when the trial judge, over defense
objection, handed the state's testifying chemist a Physician's Desk Reference
and instructed the witness to show a picture of the drug, placidyl, to the
jury. The state contended that the actions of the trial judge were for
13 Id.
" Id. at 37-38.
'6 Id. at 37.
Id.
17 See State v. Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1981) (court recognized traditional right of a
felony defendant to a panel of 20 jurors free from exception before exercising peremptory
challenges, but affirmed conviction finding no error in refusal to strike jurors for cause); State v.
Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 76 S.E.2d 265 (1953) (conviction reversed due in part to trial court's
failure to dismiss prejudiced juror for cause from panel of 20 before peremptory challenges).
"I State v. Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234, 239 (W. Va. 1982) (quoting State v. Wilson, 157 W. Va. 1036,
1043, 207 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1974)); see also West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Fisher, 289 S.E.2d
213 (W. Va. 1982) (test is whether, without bias and prejudice, a juror can render a verdict solely
on evidence under court instructions); State v. Camp, 110 W. Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931) (test is
whether a juror can, without bias or prejudice, render a verdict solely upon evidence under court
instructions disregarding any prior opinion).
"I See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (prisoner was denied due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment because the jury in the state trial was not impartial); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (right to a jury trial embraces the right to a proper trial); United States
v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954) (error occurs when judge without justification overrules a
challenge for cause, leaving a juror not impartial on the panel).
304 S.E.2d at 38.
1984]
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clarification only, and the defendant was not prejudiced thereby.2 1 The
supreme court found, however, that there was nothing in the testimony of
the witness that required clarification. The book was not offered into
evidence, and it would not have been admissible to identify the drug." Fur-
ther, the court found that the judge's actions only served to reinforce the
chemist's testimony and to indicate the judge's opinion as to the identity of
the drug."
Finding the action of the judge highly improper and prejudicial to the
defendant, the court held, consistent with past West Virginia cases, that an
intimation of a judge's opinion as to a material fact in issue constitutes rever-
sible error." Furthermore, the court stressed that a trial judge may not com-
ment upon the weight of the evidence, the credibility of a witness, or indicate
in any manner that he is partisan for either side."
The court's holding follows the general fundamental principle that a trial
judge should not do or say anything which would prejudice the parties in-
volved in litigation. "Whether or not a defendant is prejudiced" is the test
generally used to determine if conduct by a judge constitutes reversible er-
ror.' By utilizing this test, the supreme court of appeals attempts to insure
that criminal trials are conducted impartially. The court's holding requires a
trial judge to be extremely cautious not to express an opinion either directly
or by innuendo on any material matter within the exclusive province of the
jury. The caution required by a trial judge in a criminal case is a recognition
by the court that the trial judge occupies a unique position in the minds of
jurors and as such is capable of unduly influencing them.' Nonetheless, until




2 State v. McGee, 230 S.E.2d 832, 835-36 (W. Va. 1976), overruled on other grounds, State v.
McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977) (trial judge interrupted defense counsel's final argument im-
properly, but due to procedural default no error was found); see also State v. Crockett, 265 S.E.2d
268 (1979) (conviction reversed due to improper intervention and discriminatory conduct of trial
judge); State v. Loveless, 140 W. Va. 875, 87 S.E.2d 273 (1955) (trial judge who improperly called
and examined witness, intimated his belief in the defendant's guilt through this examination, and
thus invaded the province of the jury).
304 S.E.2d at 38.
2Id.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 416 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1969) (a judge's duty must be performed
with strict neutrality and utmost impartiality).
Id. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1186, 1193 (1973) (gestures or facial expressions of trial judge
may be so prejudicial as to warrant mistrial or reversal); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 3d 1313, 1318 (1970)
(prejudicial remarks by trial judge are generally a ground for reversal or new trial).
' See State v. McGee, 230 S.E.2d 832, 835-36 (W. Va. 1976), overruled on other grounds,
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tervene in the trial to control its orderly process.2 As held in the Bennett 11
opinion, the prejudice level is reached when a trial court judge (1) intimates
an opinion (2) bearing upon a material matter (3) which is an issue within the
exclusive province of the jury. 1
The third reversible error occurred during closing argument. The pro-
secuting attorney repeatedly stated that "the State's evidence was uncon-
tradicted or had not been denied, that certain evidence had not been in-
troduced, and ... the only witness who testified said [that] the defendant was
guilty."2 The court stressed that West Virginia Code Section 57-3-6" pro-
hibits a prosecutor from using the failure of a defendant to testify as the sub-
ject of comment before the court or jury. Although isolated remarks that
evidence is uncontradicted have been allowed by the court,' the repeated em-
phasis by the prosecuter concerning the uncontradicted evidence was held by
the court to constitute reversible error. 5 Therefore, the court reversed the
judgement of the trial court, and remanded the case for a new trial.
By allowing isolated remarks, yet preventing repeated emphasis of un-
contradicted evidence, the court balances the need of attorneys for some
latitude during the heat of argument with the defendant's protected right not
to take the stand. Pursuant to the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States" and article three, section five of the Constitution of West
Virginia," a defendant in a criminal case does not have to testify. As further
protection, the West Virginia Code prohibits the use of the defendant's
failure to testify from comment before the jury or court.39
I See State v. Burton, 254 S.E.2d 129, 138 (W. Va. 1979) (conviction of defendant affirmed on
review, finding conduct by trial judge not prejudicial).
1, 304 S.E.2d at 38. See also State v. Wotring, 279 S.E.2d 182, 191 (W. Va. 1981) (comment by
trial judge on non-material matter did not constitute reversible error); State v. Burton, 254 S.E.2d
129, 138 (W. Va. 1979).
304 S.E.2d at 38.
W. VA. CODE § 57-3-6 (1966 & Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part: "[The accused's]
failure to testify shall create no presumption against him, nor be the subject of any comment
before the court or jury by anyone."
", See State v. Clark, 292 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1982) (isolated remark on uncontradicted
evidence in prosecutor's closing argument held not to constitute a specific reference to
defendant's failure to testify); State v. McClure, 253 S.E.2d 555 (W. Va. 1979) (single summary
statement in closing argument by prosecutor that evidence as a whole was uncontradicted held
not a violation of W. VA. CODE § 57-3-6); State v. Simon, 132 W. Va..322, 52 S.E.2d 725 (1949) (state-
ment that the state had fully established its case and that none of the testimony had been denied
held not a direct reference to the failure of the defendant to testify).
1 304 S.E.2d at 39.
a Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall.., be compelled to
be a witness against himself."
" W. VA. CODE § 57-3-6 (1966 & Supp. 1983).
1984]
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The reasoning followed in Bennett II was based upon several prior deci-
sions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals which held that if a pro-
secutor's statements amount to a comment on the defendant's failure to
testify, prejudicial error has occurred." The holding in Bennett II illustrates
the scrupulous protection provided by the court in not allowing a defendant's
silence at trial to be treated or used as evidence against him.41
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was again given an oppor-
tunity to protect the rights of defendants in State v. Cooper." The court
addressed several issues: first, the admissibility of confessions; second, insuf-
ficiency of evidence; third, ineffective assistance of counsel; and fourth,
sentencing proportional to the offense.
The appellant in Cooper was convicted of the statutory offense of rob-
bery by violence4" and sentenced for forty-five years to the West Virginia
Penitentiary. He and his co-defendant had been arrested after trying to use
stolen credit cards.44 These cards were taken from the victim of the crime
who, six days earlier, had been beaten, knocked unconscious, and robbed of
his wallet, thirty-five dollars, and the credit cards.
While at police headquarters, officers informed Cooper that the co-
defendant had implicated him in the robbery. Cooper then made his own
statement about the robbery. Cooper's statement admitted that he and the
co-defendant had reached for and taken the victim's billfold "at the same
time" after punching the victim several times in response to a blow thrown
by the drunk victim.4 7 Cooper had been properly advised of his rights and had
signed a waiver of rights form before making his statement. 8
On appeal, the appellant argued that his confession should be invalidated.
40 State v. Noe, 230 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1976) (prosecutor's statement that "you've either got
an alibi or you don't" held a prejudicial comment on defendant's failure to testify); see also State v.
Starcher, 282 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1981) (comment that defendant was the only man who knew his
own intent in transferring drugs was held a prejudicial comment on defendant's failure to testify);
State v. Nuckolls, 273 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1980) (repeated remarks ostensibly directed at
defendant's insanity defense held to amount to a comment on defendant's failure to testify).
" See State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 S.E. 247 (1905).
42 State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983).
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-12 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
If any person commit, or attempt to commit, robbery by partial strangulation or suffoca-
tion, or by striking or beating, or by other violence to the person, or by the threat or
presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon or instrumentality whatsoever, he shall
be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less
than ten years.
" 304 S.E.2d at 852-53.
5 Id. at 852.
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Cooper cited three reasons to support the invalidation: (1) his youth, (2) his
low intelligence, and (3) the officers' comments to him that the co-defendant
had implicated him in the robbery. Cooper argued that, due to these factors,
his confession was involuntary and should therefore be inadmissible against
him.49
In the court's analysis of the circumstances surrounding the appellant's
confession, "no evidence of trickery, coercion, or duress" to induce the confes-
sion was found.-" In fact, the court noted that the confession was properly ad-
mitted because the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the confession was voluntary." The court also found no evidence that Cooper
was so youthful or subnormal in intelligence as to support invalidating his
confession.2 The court, therefore, held that the truthful statement by the
police that the co-defendant confessed, which implicated Cooper, did not
make the subsequent confession by the appellant inadmissible at trial. 3
The appellant asserted next that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support the verdict against him.Y The court applied the test enunciated in
State v. Starkey' to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the appellant was convicted. In applying the Starkey test, a court must
review the facts surrounding the crime." The court in Cooper did not state
the facts it reviewed in making its determination that the evidence was not
manifestly inadequate to support the verdict.'7 It is likely, however, that the
appellant's admissible confession strongly influenced the court.
Cooper also claimed as error that his trial counsel representation was in-
effective and inadequate.' As examples of counsel's ineffectiveness, Cooper
'" Id See State v. Adkins, 289 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1982) (intelligence a factor to be considered
in determining whether a waiver of rights was voluntary); State v. Persinger, 286 S.E.2d 261 (W.
Va. 1982) (confession held inadmissible due to police officer's inducement of defendant to cooperate
in exchange for a good recommendation to a probation officer).
50 304 S.E.2d at 853; see State v. Goldizen, 93 W. Va. 328, 116 S.E. 687 (1923) ("Information
from ... [the attorney and sheriff] to ... [the accused] that a confederate in the crime had confess-
ed and placed the guilt on the accused, unaccompanied by any threat, inducement or promise of
benefit by which he could escape from, or receive diminution of, punishment, from the conse-
quences of the crime will not render the confession inadmissible.").
1' 304 S.E.2d at 853; see State v. Goodmon, 290 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981).
304 S.E.2d at 853.
'Id.
'Id.
State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1978) (to set aside a verdict of guilty in a criminal
case the reviewing court must (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and (2) find that injustice had been done because the evidence was "manifestly inadequate" to sup-
port the guilty verdict, but (3) a verdict will not be set aside where the evidence is sufficient to
convince impartial minds of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt).
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complained that his counsel filed few pre-trial motions, failed to conduct in-
vestigations for developing a possible defense, called no witnesses at trial,
did not object to many matters at trial, failed to have an expert examine his
mental abilities, did not make an opening statement, did not move for recon-
sideration of his sentence, and failed to advise him to testify in his own
defense.
59
The court reasserted and applied the tests it had previously set forth in
State v. Thomas: 0
If counsel's error, proven to have occurred, would not have changed the
outcome of the case, it will be treated as harmless error ....
Where a counsel's performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occur-
rences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct
will be deemed effectively assistive of his client's interest, unless no
reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of
the accused. 1
Reviewing the trial court record, the court found most of counsel's al-
leged ineffective acts were not supported by any facts in the record, and the
remainder not supported by the existing facts.2 The appellant did not assert
what pretrial motions should have been filed or why they should have been
filed. 3 The record before the court did not reveal a lack of investigation, or
any indications that Cooper was so mentally deficient that he should have
been examined by an expert. The record did reveal that Cooper had told his
attorney there were no witnesses to the crime. The court emphasized to
Cooper that it was his decision whether to testify or not. 4 As the court con-
sidered each of the remaining alleged acts of ineffective assistance, it found
that counsel's performance met the standard of a reasonable qualified at-
torney.65
Finally, the court looked at the forty-five year sentence imposed upon
Cooper for his crime. Cooper asserted that the length of his sentence violated
the principle of proportionality, articulated in the West Virginia Constitu-
tion." The court found the sentence to be within the legislatively prescribed
limits of ten years to life for robbery by violence. 7 The court further noted
that a trial judge has broad discretion in determining the sentence to be im-
59 Id.
State v. Thomas, 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974).
Id. at 665-66, 203 S.E.2d at 461.




W. VA. CONST. art. HI, § 5 (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Penalties shall be propor-
tioned to the character and degree of the offence."




Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
posed. 8 Despite this broad discretion, however, the court stressed that
sentencing must be tempered by article III, section five of the West Virginia
Constitution. 9
The court noted its continued adherence to the general rule of
nonintervention with judicially imposed sentences that are within the
legislative limits." Nevertheless, the court carved out an exception, holding
that lengthy sentences which affront the sensibilities and ignore propor-
tionality principles will be reviewed."
Two tests were stressed which could be used to determine whether a
sentence is so disproportionate to a crime that it violates the constitution.
The first is a subjective test." If the sentence for the crime shocks the con-
science of the court and society, then the inquiry stops and the sentence is
unconstitutional. 3 The second test is the objective Wanstreet test.7 4 0nly if
the sentencing passes the first subjective test will the court invoke the objec-
tive Wanstreet test. The objective test is a four-factor test which considers
(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the legislative purpose behind the punish-
ment, (3) a comparison of the punishment with what would be inflicted in
other jurisdictions, and (4) a comparison of the punishment with other
related offenses within the same jurisdiction. 5
The court also pointed out that disparate sentences of co-defendants
similarly situated may be indicative of grossly disproportionate, and thereby
unconstitutional, sentencing.6 The court cautioned, however, that disparate
sentences are not per se unconstitutional, but must be evaluated with factors
such as the amount of involvement by the defendant in the criminal transac-
tion, his prior record, rehabilitative potential, and lack of remorse. 7 In
Cooper, the co-defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was sentenced
to one year in the county jail, whereas Cooper, pleading not guilty, was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to forty-five years in the state penitentiary.78
In reviewing the information available concerning the appellant, the
304 S.E.2d at 854-55; see State ex rel. Faircloth v. Catlett, 267 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1980).
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1980).
70 304 S.E.2d at 855; see State v. Newman, 108 W. Va. 642, 152 S.E. 195 (1930); Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 335, 344 (1970).
71 304 S.E.2d at 855-56.
72 Id. at 857.
73 Id.
"' Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981). The four-factor test used in
Wanstreet was first set down in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
938 (1974).
7 304 S.E.2d at 857; see also Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1978).
70 304 S.E.2d at 856; see Smoot v. McKenzie, 277 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1981).
304 S.E.2d at 856.
7' Id. at 853.
1984]
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supreme court of appeals found that Cooper was nineteen at the time of the
offense, used no weapon in commission of the crime, did not seriously or per-
manently injure the victim, had only a prior arrest for public intoxication, did
not graduate from high school, lived on the streets, and needed "guidance
and structure in his life."79 The court found Cooper's sentence to be grossly
disproportionate on its face to his crime, age, and prior record." Therefore,
the sentence was found shocking to the conscience of the court and to
society." Finding that the sentence was so offensive to our system of justice
that it did not pass the first subjective test, the court suggested that the
minimum sentence was more appropriate, and remanded the case for
resentencing.'
In summary, the court in Cooper adopted a dual branch test to determine
whether a sentence is disproportionately excessive to the crime committed.
The first branch consists of two parts, the subjective test and the objective
Wanstreet test. These tests determine if a sentence is unconstitutionally ex-
cessive in violation of proportionality principles. The second branch decides
excessiveness on disparity principles. Under this second branch, the court
looks at defendants similarly situated and considers factors such as amount
of criminal involvement, prior record, rehabilitative potential, and lack of
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